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ABSTRACT  
Although international human rights instruments assume a universalism of application and the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is one of the most ratified instruments in the 
world and therefore most likely to have global if not universal application, in fact understandings of 
childhood and definitions of ‘child’ or ‘children’ are very variable not just in different social and 
cultural contexts but in laws as well. This creates a number of challenges for formulating cross-
boundary policies and programmes, because on the one hand these differences cannot be ignored, 
but on the other hand they should not be seen as insurmountable barriers to the advocacy and 
promotion  of  children’s  rights.  This paper presents an overview of difference and similarity in the 
Commonwealth and considers some of the challenges that these may present in formulating 
strategies for international organisations such as the Commonwealth. 
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Introduction 
Traditionally a child has been defined as a comparative negative: a child is an individual who is 
not yet an adult. (van Bueren, 1998, p.33) 
Child, youth, teenager, adult, in-betweener, young adult, adolescent… a range of labels are allocated 
at various times and in various places to those young people who are the subject of this special 
issue. Perhaps surprisingly, there are no universally agreed ages at which childhood, or any 
designation  (other  perhaps  than  ‘teenager’,  which  could  be defined in numerical terms alone), 
begins or ends. The age definition applicable to the stages of human development and life—
childhood, youth, adulthood, middle age, old age—are, by their very essence, social constructs. 
Parameters for such phases (and these are only some examples) are inevitably dependent on the 
society in which the person is located.  There is no standard ‘taxonomy’ which the law can draw on.  
Views on the beginning of childhood are characterised by religious and moral standpoints on the 
beginning of life, influences which have little impact on the end of childhood. Nevertheless, 
childhood is something every human being who survives birth experiences, irrespective of its formal 
duration. This renders it unique. 
This paper seeks to provide a review of the construction of youth in the Common- wealth drawing 
on research across a range of data sources. According to Common- wealth data, some 60% of  
Commonwealth citizens are under  the age  of 30 (Commonwealth, 2013, p.12). In some states, the 
number of children (those under 18) is more than half the population. This is a significant proportion 
of young people and of course has consequences for a range of resource considerations such as 
health services, schooling, juvenile justice, the provision of food and housing and physical security. 
To achieve the objective of better understanding when a child becomes an adult or at least assumes 
many adult legal powers, this paper seeks to determine the upper parameters of childhood, using 
legal measurements. In order to answer the question when is a child not a child? a broad review of 
key moments in the progression of child to adult are considered across the Commonwealth, 
identifying the ages at which children can marry, leave school, take up full-time employment, engage 
in sexual intercourse, exercise legal capacity and be imbued with criminal responsibility. 
 
Background and Theories 
Within the Commonwealth, the Youth Affairs Division was established in 1973 and remains the 
centrepoint for work with young people. The Commonwealth pioneered the Youth Development 
Index that was launched in 2013, the 40th anniversary of the Commonwealth’s work on youth, 
development and empowerment.1 
In any writing about children and young people, it is necessary to set clearly the parameters which 
apply to the study. In this instance, the special issue concerns youth and the Commonwealth. The 
purpose of this paper is to present an overview of a range of legal age limits which apply to young 
people in the Commonwealth. As a starting point, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1989, which all Commonwealth states have ratified, states the intention that its protective ambit 
should apply to everyone below the age of 18 years (Article 1). This provides an indicator of the age 
limit prevailing in the Convention. However, this does not mean that those below the age of 18 must 
be treated as children or that the protection of the Convention ceases on a child’s 18th birthday. 
There is also recognition that individual states may vary this age. 
As states develop, the protective ambit of laws protecting young people tends to increase in scope 
and extend to offer the ‘luxury’ of greater protection to more young people—although some young 
people may resent and indeed resist this ‘benign’ patriarchy of the state. Conversely, the 
practicalities of survival mean responsibilities of adulthood are necessarily assumed at an earlier age 
in less developed and developing countries. Education is often sacrificed for labour in order to 
ensure essential family needs are met. The leisure of childhood is forfeited due to responsibilities to 
undertake domestic tasks, look after younger siblings or help cultivate or collect food. From a bio- 
logical/physiological perspective, the onset of puberty marks the transition from child- hood to 
adulthood. Physiologically this transition can be identified definitively as the body exhibits changes 
as it matures to enable sexual reproduction. However, the actual age bracket within which these 
changes occur varies. This is thus not helpful as a legal measure given the considerable variation of 
lived experience of young people. More- over, biological age does not necessarily reflect a person’s 
psychological or emotional age. Puberty may, however, be an important marker—especially for girl 
children, which marks them as ready for adult responsibility, especially where the age of marriage or 
betrothal is quite young. It may mark the point at which they are segregated, ritualized or expected 
to take on roles that distinguish them from ‘children’ despite their chronological youth. 
In all societies there is this progress along the spectrum from infant to adult, and there is a wealth of 
literature on children, youth and adults and the ‘transitioning period’ as various authors perceive it 
to be (e.g. Brannen and Nilsen, 2002). Philosophers, sociologists and educationists all have views on 
the matter. Childhood researchers often frame work around the notions of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ 
(Qvortrup et al., 1994; James et al., 1998). So too does the law. ‘Being’ refers to the child social actor 
as constructing his or her own childhood with views and experiences about being a child; ‘becoming’ 
is thus focused on what the child will become in the future, an adult in the making, not what she or 
he is at present (Uprichard, 2008, p. 304). The former is thus centred in the present; the latter very 
much future orientated. Both arguably bring an assumption of a lack of, or at least less, competency 
in childhood with a progression from a state of vulnerability (the child as receptor) to one of 
sophistication (Young, 1990, p. 41) (the child as actor or agent). This links clearly to theories on 
development which inform ideas about how best to shape and nurture the child towards adulthood. 
This links in turn to the idea of evolving capacity. Uprichard (2008, p. 1) argues for a combination of 
the two with ‘children and childhood ... always and necessarily “being and becom- ings”’ (emphasis 
in original text). This argues for reinstating the present of the child alongside the future of the child, 
recognising that children do become adults while acknowledging the influence of the present on 
shaping the child today. In this paper, the approach is particularly relevant as youth are obviously 
located at a temporal point of being, on the very edge of becoming an adult. 
Youth, therefore, are necessarily at an apex of any developmental paradigm. From a legal 
standpoint, development of legal capacity and the passing of specified minimum ages indicate 
progress towards the tipping point beyond which the child is deemed adult. However, the 
absolutism of law poses its own challenges, ignoring individualism in favour of ‘age-grading’ 
(Zimring, 2014, p. 87). There is something slightly absurd about the notion that a person awakes on 
their 18th birthday and immediately has an understanding of the implications of marriage not 
present the previous day; or with sufficient awareness of politics to justify being permitted to vote 
that day and not the day before. There also are a number of anomalies arising from the legal use of 
age limits— a child has criminal responsibility but not sufficient understanding of crime to sit on a 
jury (McDiarmid, 2013, p. 156); young people can sometimes be old enough to be married but not 
have legal capacity to contract for property, and so on. A variety of different age limits apply to 
different situations for children in different jurisdictions. There is little evidence of consistency. This 
paper selects some key age limits usually specified in law and analyses their appropriateness. 
 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and Other Instruments 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is taken as the starting point for contemporary law. It 
was adopted by the United Nations in 1989 and swiftly became the most ratified of the core UN 
human  rights  treaties—all  Commonwealth  states have ratified it. Neither of the instruments 
preceding it—the 1924 League Declaration on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations 1959 
Declaration on the Rights of the Child—mentioned an end date for childhood. Neither of these 
instruments was legally binding. The imposition of an upper age limit in the Convention was subject 
to debate during its drafting. Among the issues raised were the then prevailing lower age for 
marriage and the end of compulsory education around the world (van Bueren, 1998, p. 36).  
Fixing of an age limit was advisable given the legally binding nature of the Convention, although it 
should be noted that 18 is not the age used in all other treaties on children (see below). Within the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the emphasis is on protecting the child from harm, 
ensuring the participation of the child in decisions affecting her or him, preventing discrimination 
against the child on any ground and provision of essentials for survival and development (van 
Bueren, 1998). Its governing principles are non-discrimination (Article 2), the best interests of the 
child (Article 3), survival and development (Article 6) and the view of the child (Article 12). The 
Convention itself includes a wide range of rights, including education (Article 28), juvenile justice 
(Article 40), participation (Article 12) and labour (Article  32).  The African Union has its own regional 
treaty on children—the 1990 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. This follows the 
UN definition by applying to every human being under 18 years, though it offers no exception of 
lower national age limits (Article 2). The protective ambit is thus stronger. The Charter has a very 
wide reach, covering a range of rights. Of particular interest, customs, traditions, culture and 
religious practices that are inconsistent with the Charter are discouraged (Article 1(3); Article 21). 
There is no right to marry (the UN Convention is the same), thus it can be inferred that this should 
be post-18. However, juvenile justice (Article 17), work (Article 15) and education (Article 11) are 
covered. 
Compliance with both the Convention and the Charter is administered by committees of experts. 
Inevitably, some Commonwealth states are accountable to both. In these Commonwealth countries 
those youth below the age of 18 are, by virtue of their age, likely to be able to draw on the 
protection of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. Both these instruments apply from birth and thus include a range of younger 
people from birth through infancy and early childhood to adolescence and youth. 
Youth are, moreover, the target of specific focuses of measures within the Common- wealth and 
other regional organisations, membership of which includes Commonwealth states. The 
Commonwealth Youth Programme defines youth as those aged 15–29 years. There are of course no 
treaties associated with this. With a high percentage of youthful population, it is unsurprising that 
Africa is home to the first significant legally binding instruments on the rights and responsibilities of 
young people. The African Union adopted its Youth Charter in 2006 with the treaty entering into 
force in 2009.2 This draws on elements of the UN millennium development goals while recognising 
the marginalisation  of  many  African  youth  (preambular  paragraphs).  This instrument defines 
youth or young people as referring to those between 15 and 35 years (definitions). Although a range 
of traditional rights and freedoms are explicitly deemed applicable to young people, the treaty also 
addresses some more sensitive issues, including participation  rights3   and  the  need  for  
‘comprehensive  and  coherent’ national  youth policies (Article 12). In keeping with pre-existing 
African regional documents, Article 26 reflects the agreed responsibilities of youth.  These include 
young people being custodians of their own development, engaging in peer-to-peer education, 
rejecting and exposing corruption in work and respecting parents, elders and various elements of 
African culture, cohesion and unity. (Of considerable less relevance to the geographical focus of this 
paper,  there is also an Ibero-American  Convention  on  the  Rights  of Youth).4  
Europe has also developed focuses on youth, both in the Council of Europe and the European Union. 
While many activities stimulate and promote active youth participation, others have resulted  in 
more  formal outcomes and international collaboration. Thus, in 2013 a meeting of the Council of 
Europe and the League of Arab States supported a meeting of Arab-Euro youth in Doha, Qatar. This 
resulted in the Doha Youth Declaration on Human Rights, Participation, Intercultural Dialogue.5 The 
Youth Department of the Council of Europe is part of the Directorate of Democratic Citizenship and 
Participation of the Council of Europe. Its emphasis and its activities, while covering a wide range, 
retain a focus on ensuring youth can be active citizens. The Committee of Ministers 
recommendation Rec (2006) 14: 1:  
Recommends that the governments of member states: a. consider helping young people 
to be active citizens as a priority in public youth policies, and, in that respect, provide 
them with learning opportunities, including in their native language as appropriate, and 
experience that will increase their participation in public life. 
The Council of Europe has also published a Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young 
People in Local and Regional Life,6 which does not have the status of a legally binding convention. 
This instrument draws on both the participatory provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and work leading up to the 2005 European Year of Citizenship Through Education (EYCE).7 
This instrument, and its follow-up reports, is beyond the scope of the present paper. The European 
Union also pro- motes youth involvement in policy discussions and more active citizenship 
participation, thus the 2014 EU Youth Conference, hosted by the Greek presidency, addressed the 
theme of youth entrepreneurship to foster social inclusion of young people. The conference made a 
number of recommendations which were fed into Council discussions and resolutions. 
 
Method  
To report accurately the applicable age limits pertaining in each Commonwealth state for a range of 
activities would require a comprehensive review of national laws in each state. Where there is no 
written constitution or identifiable national law on youth, a plethora of laws may need to be 
consulted. In those common law jurisdictions, national judicial decisions may also be required. The 
scale of such a project is beyond the scope of the present paper. Rather, this paper seeks to present 
an approximate snapshot of pre- vailing age limits across the Commonwealth using a simpler 
doctrinal approach. This paper uses a single set of documentation which is available for all 
Commonwealth states—reports of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child.8 As noted above, 
all UN member states are high contracting parties and thus all UN member states report periodically 
to the treaty monitoring body, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, on progress made 
towards realising the treaty provisions. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child has provisions 
addressing, directly or indirectly, all the principal indicators selected for this study. It was thus 
possible to anticipate that a reason- ably full set of documentation would emerge. 
There are, inevitably a number of flaws in this method of data collection. First, the presence of data 
in the first place depends on the matter having been discussed by the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child during the state reporting system. This is not always the case and we are aware that 
there are age limits in some states which do not appear in the table. Second, the data may be 
inaccurate and out of date. Owing to the backlog before the UN treaty bodies and the delays in 
submitting reports, the information is often outdated before the committee meeting. Moreover, 
some states have not been considered for several years. Once again, a number of errors are known 
but the data is presented as collected. Third, the authors are aware of a number of other anomalies 
in the presented data. This is inevitable when a single source is used for research such as this. 
However, it is contended that the flaws are within an acceptable level of error because the use of 
the UN documentation permits an overview of the position (albeit possibly slightly historic and/or 
incomplete) in the Commonwealth. (There are also inconsistencies between the UN data presented 
on education and the number of mean years of schooling in each state which contributes to the 
education domain recorded in the Commonwealth Youth Index. The ranking for education and the 
ranking for the UN data would appear to offer different results.) 
The final column in the table ranks the Commonwealth states on youth development. The 2013 
Commonwealth Youth Development Index ranking is also provided for all countries where available 
(i.e. excluding Kiribati, Tuvalu and Nauru each of which had inadequate data available) 
(Commonwealth, 2013). The definition of youth development provided by this Commonwealth Index 
is: 
 enhancing the status of young people, empowering them to build on their compe- 
tencies and capabilities for life. [Enabling] young people to contribute and benefit from a 
politically stable, economically viable, and legally supportive environment, ensuring their 
full participation as active citizens in their countries. (Common- wealth, 2013, p. 14) 
 
It is a composite index based on data available against 15 identified indicators under five key 
domains. The domains, identified for their importance in youth development, are: education, health 
and well-being, employment, civic participation and political participation. The aggregate data is 
then processed with each state given a final score and thus ranked. Employment and education are 
the most relevant for the present paper, though the overall ranking score (across all domains) is 
provided in the table. It is perhaps unsurprising that Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Malta, the UK, 
Cyprus and Jamaica are the highest ranked states in terms of youth development. The lowest ranked 
states, with low youth development, are Uganda, Rwanda, Malawi, Swaziland, Saint Kitts and Nevis 
and Mozambique. All other states are categorised as medium youth development.  
 
Results 
The results are subject to the caveats outlined in the Method section above. As a meta- analysis 
across a wide geographical area, the findings can stand even when some of the numerical data may 
be outdated or even inaccurate. 
 
Age of Childhood 
Not all states specify the age at which childhood ends. In some instances, this is covered in national 
law or the Constitution, though not in the studied UN documentation. As Table 1 illustrates, most 
Commonwealth states, where an age is specified, use 18 years. This certainly reflects the preferred 
minimum age for the end of childhood which the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child promotes 
(and the African Charter).  
Moreover, there is a general trend towards 18 as the age at which childhood ends (van Bueren, 
1998, p. 38). This is borne out by comments made in the concluding observations of the UN 
Committee on the Rights of the Child in respect of those states with a lower age limit. Some states 
have not specified an age for this in the UN documentation used in this survey, though this does not 
mean there is no such specification in national law. 
The importance of the upper age of childhood becomes apparent when you consider its 
implications. Generally, those considered children benefit from specific protective measures under 
national law and/or are deemed to lack some/all adult legal capacity. There  is  thus  an  implicit  
recognition  of  the  need  for  special  consideration  below  that age. Nevertheless, as the data 
shows, the specified upper age limits for childhood are often higher than other ages in the table. 
Thus in many states, those deemed legally to be children can marry, work full time and also have full 
criminal responsibility. It is notable that in some African states, the age limits across the activities 
noted are higher than the average in the Commonwealth, though it is not clear whether this can be 
attributed to the influence of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Similarly, it 
is not clear from the data alone whether the law is observed in practice or whether social, religious, 
cultural or other factors may have an influence, for example on the age young people are 
employed—and in what capacity and context, the age at which they marry, and/or the justice   
system to which they may be subject.  
 
Legal Capacity and Criminal Liability 
As a whole, the Commonwealth states have lower ages of minimum criminal responsibility than the 
UN Committee would like. Indeed, Commonwealth states have some of the lowest ages of criminal 
responsibility in the world. Mauritius is one of the few states in the world with no minimum age, 
thus even an infant is deemed to have criminal responsibility (Cipriani, 2009). In contrast, the 
Bahamas, Cyprus, Rwanda and the Seychelles are among countries having the highest age for 
criminal liability across the Commonwealth, with the age of 14. Some countries apply different age 
limits depending on the nature of the crime—for example, New Zealand. Other countries have a 
specific juvenile justice system through which most child offenders are processed— Scotland (within 
the UK) is a leading example, although somewhat paradoxically it has a very low  age limit  of  eight 
years  for  criminal  responsibility.9  McDiarmid  (2013, pp. 148, 153) argues on the complexity of the 
concept of criminal responsibility, noting the importance of both understanding (what must be 
understood in order to impute criminal responsibility) and experience (the lived experience of the 
child and the impact exerted on understanding of wrongdoing). Clearly, setting any age limit in this 
context is arbitrary in so far as understanding is likely to vary from one individual to another, as will 
experience. Raising the age of criminal responsibility to 18 is, however, controversial. 
According to the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 
‘the Beijing Rules’, the age of criminal responsibility should ‘not be fixed at too low an age level, 
bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity’ (UN, 1985, p. 4.1). Some 
research suggests full brain maturity for the purpose of criminal responsibility is only achieved after 
the age of 18 (Midson, 2012, discussing the mental acuity of adolescents who kill). Criminal 
responsibility is usually linked to the perceived understanding of wrongdoing, and consequential 
responsibility for actions and omissions. It is notable that the age limits specified for criminal 
responsibility in the table are generally the lowest of all the age limits listed. Children can thus be 
criminally liable for their actions for many years (sometimes even a decade) before they are deemed 
capable of consenting to sexual relations, consenting to marriage or working full time. 
Hollingsworth (2007, p. 196) argues that conferring criminal responsibility is a form of recognising 
and giving effect to the independent autonomy of the child. That autonomy seems to be conferrable 
for criminal responsibility but not for legal capacity is perhaps curious and the position of criminal 
responsibility contrasts with the ages of legal/contractual liability. It is acknowledged that the ages 
given in the table are generally a stipulated full legal capacity, rather than contractual liability (after 
all people enter into contracts at a very young age—buying food or contracting for transport to 
school, for example). In general, the ages for legal capacity are above the minimum age of full-time 
work. It might be hoped that this implies that some form of contractual capacity must exist for youth 
who are working. It may, however, be the case that the lack of contractual capacity or contractual 
autonomy conferred on the child means that others contract on their behalf. Whether the child can 
then escape those contractual obligation on ‘coming of contractual age’ is a question which goes 
beyond  the  scope  of  this paper. 
 
 
Education, Marriage and Work 
As far as international law is concerned, there is no specification on the age of marriage. The 1962 
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages 
leaves discretion to the state on the age limit, albeit the General Assembly gave an early indication 
that 15 would be appropriate as a minimum age (GA Res 2018(XX) (1965), Principle II). Education, in 
contrast, should be compulsory and free for primary education (Article 13(20(1) International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966). Primary education, however, is defined 
more by content than time (CESCR, 1999). As for work, the International Labour Organisation’s 
Convention concerning the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 1973 has a general age limit 
of 15 years (18 for hazardous work). As is apparent from the table, some states in the 
Commonwealth have age limits below 18 for work and/or for marriage. This is not per se illegal for 
those states not party to the treaties noted above. It does, however, as indicated above, create 
potential for the disruption or constraining of other rights of the child. 
Disparities between the minimum school leaving age, the minimum age for working full time and the 
minimum age of marriage are important (Tomasevski, 2003, p. 27). Should a young person marry or 
start full-time work, she or he is less likely to continue with compulsory schooling. The length of time 
for compulsory schooling varies from country to country, as the table shows. Should a young person 
be able to start full-time work before she or he should finish compulsory education, then clearly an 
economic imperative may limit the child’s access to education. Similarly, should a young person be 
able to marry and start a family before the end of compulsory schooling, that latter period of 
schooling may be compromised. A lack of access to education inevitably can have an impact on 
employment opportunities. This in turn can affect earning potential, securing an adequate standard 
of living, and so on. 
Of course, there are also interesting variations and overlaps between the age of consensual sexual 
relations and the minimum age of marriage. In some states, sexual relations before marriage are 
forbidden, thus the ages are the same. It should also be noted that same-sex relationships are not 
necessarily subject to the same age limits. Same-sex relationships are criminalised in states such as 
Uganda and in all Commonwealth Pacific states except Fiji. In South Africa, a higher age limit applies 
to same-sex consensual relations than otherwise. Canada has possibly the widest range of regulation 
in this area: the minimum age is usually 14 years with an exception when the younger partner is at 
least 12 years; the age difference between the partners is less than two years; the older partner is 
not in a position of trust or authority over the younger; and the younger partner is not the 
dependant of the older (UN Doc CRC/C/83/Add.6, para. 45). 
Of particular concern is the frequent disparity in age limits between boy and girl children. In several 
states, females can marry at a younger age than males. The minimum age for consensual sexual 
relations is also different, sometimes with no age specified for males. This is clearly discrimination on 
grounds of sex, something that is prohibited in terms of Article 2(2) of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and Article 3 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (where 
applicable). The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child inevitably draws to the attention of states 
any inequality in age limits. It is acknowledged that in the case of sexual relations, many states argue 
that the age limits for girl children are protective in their aim, given the potential consequences 
which may ensue. Quite who is controlling the reproductive rights of young women in these 
situations is perhaps more controversial. 
Within the Commonwealth Youth Development Index, drilling down to the data reveals that 
Pakistan, Singapore, Bangladesh, Indian then Tonga are the top five countries for employment,  
yet none is ranked highly on high youth development overall— though Singapore is eighth, thus the 
top medium development country overall (Commonwealth, 2013, p. 30). For education, New 
Zealand, Canada, Australia, Samoa and Cyprus are the top five on that domain alone 
(Commonwealth, 2013, p. 30). All except Samoa are in the high development ranking overall. This 
would appear to emphasise the importance of education to development, at least using the 
Common- wealth priority areas. 
 
Implications 
This paper shows that the legal construction of childhood and youth is flexible within the 
Commonwealth. There is some evidence of a tendency towards using the UN Convention childhood 
upper age of 18 as the upper age of childhood. However, that is by no means uniform within the 
Commonwealth (or indeed beyond). As for youth as a separate construction, it is only in African 
states which accept the African Union Charter that youth rights are explicitly articulated. Within the 
Commonwealth organisation, the designation of youth is more for data purposes than shaping laws 
and policies. Nevertheless, there is recognition of the importance of the youth demographic, both 
now and for the future development of states. 
Most states express concerns over youth unemployment, for example. The rhetoric of the 
international instruments on securing the best for children and ensuring a secure future for young 
people is influential and, of course, pragmatic. States often prioritise children over adults—for 
example, the expenditure on education and on child health (there are numerous indicators and 
measurements of child health, not least in the millennium development goals). 
The disparity in ages within each country for the activities specified in the table arguably indicates an 
incoherent approach to youth issues across the Commonwealth. In many instances the laws have 
evolved piecemeal over the years with little attention paid to the interaction of the age limits, or a 
holistic approach to young people, or changing perceptions of childhood and youth. 
While youth are recognised within the Commonwealth there is little evidence of the Commonwealth 
states taking a holistic approach towards reviewing and then where appropriate revising legal 
provisions to ensure consistency. As the limited research used to inform this paper demonstrates, 
there is scope for much more detailed country by country research to inform an accurate and 
coherent understanding of the legal context of young people across the Commonwealth. In the 
meantime, perhaps consideration could be given to the better promotion of youth rights and 
applicable laws so that not only can every young person in the Commonwealth understand which 
age limits apply to her or him and why, but also so that the voices of young people can be engaged 
in the discussions that attach to the possibilities of reforming the laws which govern their lives. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Available   from   http://www.youthdevelopmentindex.org/views/index.php#OVER 
2. Full text available, http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_YOUTH_CHARTER.pdf 
3. Article 11 on youth participation guarantees youth participation in all spheres of society—local, 
national regional and continental. It also covers issues of access to information. 
4. Full text available, http://icmyo2.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/iberoamerican-convention.pdf 
5. Available in English from 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/News&Calls/2013_Doha_Youth_Declara tion_en.pdf 
6. Full text available, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/Source/Coe_youth/Participation/COE_charter_participa 
tion_2013_en.pdf  
7. Available from http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Co-operation/education/E.D.C.  
8. Similar documentation was also used for the short table published in Tomasevski (2003, p. 28). 
9. In Scotland, a legislative change means children under 12 cannot be prosecuted in adult courts, 
though the minimum age of criminal responsibility remains eight years. 
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